

# The Role and Influence of Regional Political Parties in India's Political Landscape

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## ABSTRACT

Party systems: whence do they originate? This dissertation's first section makes the case that the rule of law—which is defined as the degree to which the state consistently carries out through the enforcement of its laws and policies. Voters develop strong relationships to politicians in an environment where the rule of law is weak, and they support the political party that their favorite politician decides to form or join. As a result, politicians ultimately influence the creation of the party system since their choices about party allegiance affect the viability of political parties. In contrast, people who live in environments with strong legal protections develop strong loyalties to political parties, and as a result, they choose which parties make up the party system. In the second section of the dissertation, the situation of local political parties in India is examined using the theory regarding party system creation under lax legal protections. This project focuses on the reasons why so many politicians opt to form and join regional parties in order to explain the success of these political movements in a country with a lax rule of law, like India. The remarkable prosperity of Indian regional parties can be attributed to two main factors: 1) the geographical concentration of caste groupings (and, to a lesser extent, other politically significant groups) and 2) the prevalence of coalition governments at the national level. Because politicians from different caste groups are forced to collaborate with one another, the geographic concentration of caste groupings

increases the costs involved in starting a national party. Alongside another. Meanwhile, by enabling regional parties to engage in national politics, frequent coalition government raises the advantages of belonging to a regional party.

### **Rule of Law in Regional Party**

Local electoral politics differ greatly from one another. In certain regions, a stable group of politically distinct parties play a major role in electoral politics. In other regions, politics is extremely individualized and parties are typically fluid and ideologically ambiguous. This section and the subsequent aid in elucidating a portion of the noted fluctuations in the tone of electoral politics. This chapter goes into greater detail on how the rule of law affects whether political parties or candidates dominate the political landscape. It provides an abstract explanation of how electoral politics are influenced by the rule of law. Since the phrase "rule of law" has been used in a variety of contexts, Section 1 aims to define it. Section 2 that follows describes how the rule of law affects whether election competitiveness centers on parties. Section 3 explains voting based on attributes. Two significant possibilities that could possibly help to explain voters' inclination to care more about candidates than parties are briefly discussed in Section 4: cabinet governance and electoral institutions.

A definition of the rule of law is the degree to which the government consistently and regularly carries out its legal and regulatory obligations. The phrase describes the discrepancy between a state's declared intentions and actual actions. The rule of law is weakened and there is a big gap when the state makes policy promises but then breaks them. A state's rule of law is strong and the gap is minimal when it makes policy commitments and keeps them. Stated differently, the degree of certainty is the rule of law, citizens' level of assurance that policy outcomes will be in line with the policy's content. The rule of law is weak when there is little confidence that policies will result in the desired results; it is strong when there is a great degree of assurance.

## Research question

- The first thing that comes to mind is where do party systems come from? How it started? Why its important and necessary? How it is relevant to the nation?
- Why there is a need of strong ruled law for party system? how it hold or support the society? Why there is a coalition of government for regional party? This are the questions that we wouldbe dealing and exploring throughout and unravel it.

## Objectives

The main objective of this is regional party and its evolution along with ups and down. With regional parties as main focus, this study explore its beginning and its stand till this date. It also help us understand how it is different from other political parties, And how it is equally important.

## Methodology

The study has qualitative and quantitative datas and are broad categories covering many research approaches and methods. While both share the primary aim of knowledge acquisition, quantitative research is numeric and objective, seeking to answer questions like when or where. On the other hand, qualitative research is conserved with subjective phenomena that can't be numerically measured, like how different people experience grief. So without any further a due lets get to the study that insights the dynamic of relations, including historical context, events, challenges, claims, and important party.

## Distinguishing the feeble rule of law from other ideas

The first notable difference is Some investigations view the rule of law as the outcome of a particular institutional setup, like judicial independence, or as synonymous with the general idea of the rule of law, such property rights or contract enforcement. However, studies indicate that it encompasses the entire spectrum of a state's operations and may result from a number of causes. Other meanings of the phrase imply a standard, like Other usages of

the phrase allude to normative circumstances, such democratic, open governance. Rule of law as I understand it is a completely empirical result.

### **What establishes a strong or weak rule of law**

The rule of law can be linked to the state's declared policies (i.e., what it says it will do) or to what it actually does, since it symbolizes the difference between what the state claims it will do and what it really does. Policies set forth by a state define, on the one hand, the standards that must be met for the law to be applied consistently over time and to every individual. Assuming that a state has the same ability to enact laws and programs, a more interventionist state with "more law" ought to be more susceptible to a weak rule of law because it places more demand on itself that it may be unable to meet. A state that has a strong rule of law need not be strong or capable in the strict sense; rather, it need only be strong or capable enough to consistently enforce the laws that are written in it. Likewise, a weak rule of law does not necessarily indicate a complete absence of strength, merely a failure when compared to what the state undertakes.

Therefore, the strength of the rule of law in a community can be determined by the amount of legislation or the degree of state interference. The kinds of legislation and the areas of policy that the state regulates may also have an impact on how strong the rule of law is. Various policy domains may have various rules of law, and these variations may be systematic. It could be simpler to execute some policies than others. On the other hand, the efficacy of the rule of law is dependent on bureaucracy carrying out policy given a predetermined set of commitments or laws. Numerous problems within bureaucracies have the potential to erode the rule of law.

### **The legality and political**

This section describes the influence of the rule of law on voters after providing a clear explanation of what it is. More precisely, it talks about how the rule of law dictates how voters want to utilize their vote. The decisions that people make when casting their ballots is a function of how they intend to use their vote. In general, this section makes the case that people vote to affect policy execution in circumstances where the rule of law is weak, which

causes them to fixate their attention on the specific candidates seeking office. On the contrary, when the rule of law is robust, people vote to shape policy, grabbing their attention and concentrate their efforts on political parties. Voters rely their decisions mostly on specific politicians in scenarios where there is a weak rule of law and they want to have a say in how policies are executed.

The actions of a politician can be divided into two broad groups. The first is legislative action, which deals with the process of creating policies. It covers all activities associated with passing legislation, such as meeting with lobbyists, going to hearings, writing legislation, and taking part in discussions in parliament. Particularistic service, which is related to the process of implementing policies, is the second. Any use of a politician's resources, influence, or authority on favor of a single constituent or ad hoc group of constituents—as compared to a class of citizens whom a policy or law particularly targets—is referred to as particularistic service.

### **Voting while the law is not well-enforced**

Voters are interested in influencing the process of implementing policies in weakly regulated environments, which necessitates paying significantly more attention to individual politicians than to political parties. This section presents what I refer to as attribute voting, a voting model under a weak rule of law. Treat voting in an environment with a strong rule of law as policy voting, treating it as analogous to the Downsian spatial voting model, in which voters select the party that is closest to them on a policy space. As there is already a wealth of material on spatial voting. Rather, I concentrate on attribute voting in weak legal systems. Voters are aware that a politician would start doing favors in the morning and end them later in the day. Those are more likely that those at the top of the line will get their requests acknowledged and, ideally, fulfilled.

As a result, three things are important to voters:

- 1) where they stand in relation to other constituents;
- 2) the length of time the politician will continue to get favors; and

3) the politician's likelihood of granting the favors she receives. Voters do not, however, queue up at random.

Certain voters are given preference by the politician and are placed at the front of the queue. Therefore, the possibility that a politician will assist a specific voter depends on three factors:

- 1) who the politician prioritizes in line;
- 2) the number of voters the politician encounters on a given day; and
- 3) the politician's tendency to attend to the concerns of her petitioners.

In order to increase the possibility that the politician in power will

- 1) put him at the front of the line,
- 2) hear a lot of petitions, and
- 3) decide to help most of those she hears, the voter wants to make sure his favor is heard and granted.

### **Regional Parties in India: An Overview**

In India the term "regional party," as defined, encompasses scores of parties and hundreds of independent candidates that contest elections but win support across only a narrow geographical swathe of the country. Most of these parties are failures, as indeed, most of India's failed parties are also regional parties. However, the Indian party system includes more than three dozen regional parties that figure highly into state-level party systems and play roles of varying importance at the national level, ranging from those that simply aim to win a single seat in the Lok Sabha to those that are coalition king-makers and occupy important ministerial berths. The world of regional parties in India is therefore a complex and crowded one, and this chapter aims to make sense of it. Consequently, much is descriptive, providing the lay of the land with terms to regional parties.



### **Definitions and measurement**

Intuitively, national and regional parties would seem easy to define and identify. National parties pertain to the country as a whole, while regional parties to a small part of it. Actual definition and measurement are, however, surprisingly complex. In this section, it outline how conceptualize regional and national parties and classify parties accordingly. Then discussed the alternative ways of thinking about regional parties and explain the reasons to classify parties.

### **Operationalization**

Classifying a party as either regional or national based on the geographic distribution of its voters. In other words, a party's support base determines whether classified it as a regional or national party. A regional party is a party whose electoral support is disproportionately concentrated in one or a small number of regions, whereas a national party is a party whose electoral support extends across more than just a handful of a country's regions.

In order to determine whether or not a party's voter base is disproportionately concentrated, we computed a political party and political region Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI gauges market concentration amongst enterprises in an industrial organization. determining the degree to which an area monopolizes support for a party by computing an HHI. The HHI formula for markets and companies is:

$$H = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i^2$$

where  $S_i$  is firm  $i$ 's market share, and  $N$  is the number of firms. As used,  $S_i$  is region  $i$ 's share of the party's votes, and  $N$  is the number of regions. Scores on the index range from zero to one. A score of zero indicates that a party's votes are dispersed across all of a country's regions in perfect proportion to each region's share of the total population of voters. A score of one indicates a party whose votes all come from a single region. In most countries,

especially in federal ones, these are usually called states or provinces.

### **Criticisms of the measure**

A potential criticism of this procedure is that dichotomizing parties into "regional" and "national" discards useful information that the index provides about how regional or national a party is, particularly in the calculation of the total regional party vote share. An alternative to this strategy could be to multiply each party's vote share by its score on the index and then sum those figures to arrive at the regional party vote share. In this way, a party that is perfectly national would have none of its votes count towards the regional party vote total, a party that is perfectly regional would have all of its votes count towards the regional party vote total, and parties that are in between would have some, but not all, of their votes counted. And ensure not to calculate regional party vote shares in this way because the substantive impact of movements along the scale is not a linear function. Movements along the scale close to zero imply far greater changes than very large movements along the scale at values closer to one.

Analyzing this with reference to the effective number of parties (ENP), a metric commonly employed in the study of politics (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), may help you understand it. The ENP is calculated very similarly to the HHI that use to calculate the fragmentation of a party's vote across regions, except that the ENP equals the number one divided by the un-normalized HHI. A measure analogous to the ENP, the effective number of regions (ENR), could be calculated similarly. A final criticism could be that the measure is redundant in the Indian case, since the country's electoral authority, the Election Commission of India (ECI), already classifies parties as either national parties or state parties. The ECI's definition is, however, problematic as a measure meant to capture support base. Regardless of the size of the states, the ECI considers a party to be national if it receives recognition in any four of them. Parties win recognition in a state through 59 one of two ways. The first way is through activity and seats won. A party must be active for at least five years and have won at least one twenty-fifth of a state's seats in the Lok Sabha or one thirtieth of the seats in the state's Vidhan Sabha (state legislative assembly). The second route is through vote shares. A party gains recognition in a state if it wins at least 6% of the



state-level vote either in national or state elections.

### **Coalition Government and the Rise of Regional Parties**

After several decades of electoral stability, the percentage of the Indian electorate that voted for regional parties nearly doubled during the 1990s. The 1989 general elections brought to an end over forty years of almost uninterrupted single-party majority (SPM) government. Before the 1990s, support for Indian regional parties had been fairly constant. But, in 1989, as a result of jockeying among the country's three main national parties Congress, BJP, and Janata Dal--Congress lost its legislative majority and in dramatic fashion pitched the country into a new era of coalition government. By the early 1990s, it was clear that no party was likely to win a SPM in the foreseeable future. As a result, payoffs associated with membership in a regional party increased substantially. Parties that had long been marginal players at the national level were suddenly critical players. Political entrepreneurs increasingly chose to form their own regional parties, and successful regional parties began to crop up in all corners of the country. Ambitious young politicians opted to join regional parties rather than casting their lots in with one of the major national parties. These politicians brought with them voters from their own constituencies. The implication of the Indian experience for other weak rule of law democracies is that regional parties should be more successful in countries with frequent national-level coalition governments than in countries in which SPM governments are the norm. A further, more general, implication is that regional parties should be more successful in settings where small parties have access to national-level power.

But Chapter 3's argument is not dynamic. It cannot explain the rapid changes that beset the party system beginning in the early 1990s. To explain the surge in regional party success in the 1990s, I turn in this chapter to an analysis of the payoffs associated with regional party membership and how those payoffs changed over time. Chapter 4 is divided into seven sections. The first (Section 1) presents a general argument linking coalition government to regional party success. Section 2 addresses questions of endogeneity by establishing causality in the Indian case. Sections 3 and 4 detail the payoffs associated with membership in regional parties in India during the pre- and post-1991 eras, respectively. Section 5 examines how changing incentives led to changing behavior among politicians. Finally, section 6 refutes

four important alternative hypotheses.

### **Coalitions and regional parties**

Coalitions matter for regional parties in this setting because coalition government increases politicians' payoffs for membership in a regional party. The logic underlying the argument proceeds in three steps.

- (1) Without coalitions, regional parties cannot participate in government and access the resources associated with governing.
- (2) Without the ability to form part of the government and access the rewards of office, politicians are less likely to join regional parties.
- (3) The smaller the number of credible politicians that join regional parties, the smaller the voteshare those regional parties will garner.

### **The (in) ability to participate in national government**

Without coalition government, regional parties cannot access the various resources associated with heading or participating in the national government. The assumption underpinning this step in the logic is that regional parties alone can never constitute a SPM. If a regional party could win a legislative majority, then it could access all the resources of governing without having to participate in coalitions. But, if regional parties cannot constitute SPM governments, then they can only gain access to national-level power through coalition government. In most countries, a party cannot win a SPM and remain a regional party; in order to capture enough seats to win an SPM, its votes must be sufficiently distributed across a country that it could no longer qualify as a regional party. Infrequent exceptions occur (Pakistan in 1971, St. Kitts and Nevis), and these exceptions point to the unlikely confluence of circumstances required to produce regional parties with SPMs. One region must account for a majority of a country's legislative seats, and the electoral system must be highly disproportional. When one region accounts for a majority of a country's legislative seats, then a party can potentially win all of its votes in a single region and still win an SPM. Countries with a large number of regions rarely have a single region larger than all other regions combined. Rather, regions constituting a majority of a country's legislative seats are almost exclusively found in countries with two,

three, or perhaps four region. But, even if a single region accounts for a majority of a country's seats, a party can only win a SPM by winning a sizeable majority of the region's seats. In extremely large regions, this is almost impossible to achieve under a highly proportional electoral system, since single parties rarely win commanding majorities of more than two-thirds or three-quarters of all votes.

### **The importance of joining national government**

After demonstrating that regional parties are unable to utilize national government resources unless they are part of a coalition, the next phase of the argument is to demonstrate that politicians are unlikely to join a party that will be out of power for an extended period of time. This claim is reasonable if politicians highly prize being members of a party that participates in government. They will tend to avoid joining parties that cannot reasonably be expected to participate in government. However, if this is not the case-if politicians do not highly prize their party's participation in government-then the permanent exclusion of small parties from power at the national level will not deter politicians from joining regional parties. For convenience, I divide politicians into two categories: "believers" who participate in politics and work on behalf of a political party because they thrive on the "collective incentives...of identity (one participates because one identifies with the organization), incentives of solidarity (one participates because one shares the political or social goals of the other participants), and ideological incentives (one participates because one identifies with the 'cause' of the organization)" and "careerists," motivated by the promise of "power, status, and material incentives". For "believers," winning elected office and participating in government are usually a means to an end, while for "careerists" office is an end in itself. For office-seeking "careerists," exclusion from national-level government would undoubtedly deter them from joining a regional party. SPM governments preclude politicians in regional parties from accessing the power, prestige, and material resources available only from the national government-in short, the very goods that motivate a "careerist's" participation in politics. The important question therefore is whether "believers" behave differently from "careerists."

## **The Conclusion**

This study presents a considerably different explanation of party system formation than is generally seen in the literature by arguing that such a shift is really suitable throughout much of the world. But the dissertation does more than just offer a different perspective. It goes much farther by defining the circumstances under which party systems might be considered a when they should be seen as a product of politicians' choices and preferences (i.e., under a weak rule of law) and when they should be seen as a result of voters' preferences and decisions (i.e., under strong rule of law). Voters are less worried about using their vote to voice their opinions when there is a lack of a strong rule of law and residents do not expect the government to fulfill its obligations. Rather, they are worried about utilizing their vote to affect which State policy will be carried out by politicians. If voters are solely concerned with the Politicians bear a major portion of the blame for the structure of the party system if voters elect people and are generally unconcerned with the party of their choice. Party structures take shape depending on the kinds of parties that politicians are prepared to start and join.

In contrast, well-known literary arguments hold true in situations when the rule of law is robust. Strong legal regulations allow party systems to represent the preferences of the people, not just the politicians. It is necessary to comprehend the sources of voter preferences as well as the ways in which formal institutions influence them in order to comprehend party systems. To put it briefly, the first half of the dissertation makes a theoretical connection between a politics that is heavily focused on candidates and a weak rule of law. In consequence, candidate-centered politics give rise to party systems, the nature of which is mostly determined by the actions and choices of the elite. The dissertation's discussion on party systems and the rule of law is expanded upon in the section on Indian regional parties. India is a democracy with a weak rule of law, therefore political decisions should affect the country's party structure. The fundamental question that needs to be addressed when discussing regional parties in India is not why so many citizens like voting for regional parties, but rather why so many politicians choose to join them. The latter question is examined in earlier research on regional parties in other nations, the majority of which have robust legal

systems. This study addresses the subject of regional parties by concentrating on politicians in an environment with a weak rule of law. Consequently, it arrives at slightly different conclusions drawn from earlier research. The geographic concentration of politically significant groups and the frequency of coalition governments at the national level are significant determinants of politicians' decisions in India regarding their affiliation with regional or national parties.

The establishment of national parties is particularly costly when groups are concentrated, which is why many political entrepreneurs choose to join regional parties. In India, the geographic concentration of groups—primarily caste groups of people, but also linguistic and personality-based groups—means that a significant portion of politicians have always preferred to found regional parties. Furthermore, a coalition administration at the national level gives small regional parties the chance to engage in governance and reap the benefits of power, which is why many politicians choose to join regional parties in situations where they otherwise would not. While the concentration of caste groups and the emergence of coalition governments are unique to India, these arguments offer broader insights into the conditions under which regional parties may succeed in systems with lax rule of law. Regional parties ought to be especially powerful when the majority of notable organizations are concentrated geographically and when tiny parties may access power at the federal level.

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